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From decade to decade the dominant ideological
approach to 'the economy' shifts its ground. This shift
all too often masks the real nature of markets, both
public and private. This is certainly the case in the
market for health care where there is a tendency for
policy makers, when confronted by the problems of
inefficiency and inequality, to be stampeded into the
adoption of over-simple 'solutions' to the national
health care problems. Thus in Britain the Labour
Party, in France the Socialist Government, and in
West Germany the recently ruling Social Democrats,
in the United States the opposition Democrats, and in
Australia the newly elected Labour Government, all
have responded to the inadequacies of their domestic
health care systems by pledging more public
expenditure, and more public regulation of the finance
and provision of health care.
This approach by collectivists has a parallel on the
opposite side of the spectrum amongst the proponents
of the liberal market tradition. The Conservative
Government in Britain, the Giscard opposition in
France, the Christian Democrat Government in West
Germany, the Reagan Government in the United
States, and the recently deposed Fraser Liberal
Government in Australia, have all responded to the
problems inherent in their health care systems by
advocating the redesign of the public sector which
provides health care, and the encouragement of the
extension of private finance and provision of health
care.
Ideological convictions lead policy makers to adopt
opposite policies (privatisation and socialisation) to
remedy the same problems in the health care market.
Why are opposite policies adopted? What is the nature
of the problems which exist in all health care markets?
How can resource allocation be made more efficient?
These are some of the questions that this article
addresses.
This paper draws heavily on Maynard's material in McLachlan and
and Maynard [1982].
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The Competing Ideologies
The competing policies offered by collectivists and
liberals to remedy the defects of health care systems
are derived from different policy goals and the
different means that are available to achieve these
goals. The liberal typically is concerned with the
freedom of the individual and he sees this as the
primary social goal. He fixes his sights on the
competitive market with its private ownership and
individual consumers. Thus in the UK the liberal
'reformers' of the national health service (NHS) have a
strong preference for freedom as characterised in the
market ideology, and from this prime objective it is
possible to identify their preferred means to attain this
goal, which are as follows:
Selectivity Health care is part of the reward
system of society, and the wellbeing of society
depends on this reward system. As a result access to
health care is to be determined largely by ability
and willingness to pay. Those without the ability to
pay will be guaranteed some minimal level of access
to health care. This approach regards inequality as
efficient: it is the engine of economic growth and
the guarantee of freedom. Also it implies private
(insurance) finance of health care.
Private ownership Individual freedom requires
decentralisation and private (usually non-profit
making) ownership of the means of health care
production (eg hospitals) with only minimal
government control of finance and resource
allocation.
Rewards Providers of care (cg doctors) will be
directly rewarded according to market forces,
usually with a fee per item-of-service system of
remuneration for doctors and per diem fees paid to
hospitals.
Those rejecting this ideology (cg the collectivist
defenders of the NHS) regard equality of access to
health care and of health status as their prime
objectives. The means by which this goal can be
attained are:
Universality Health care is not part of the reward
system and should be allocated on the basis of need
or the patients' ability to benefit from care
regardless of their willingness or ability to pay.
Universality implies public finance of health care.
Public ownership Equality requires centralisation
and public ownership of the means of health care
production (eg hospitals) with extensive govern-
ment control of finance and resource allocation.
Rewards Providers of care will be rewarded by the
outcome of bargaining procedures between mono-
poly providers (eg doctors) and monopsonistic
financers (eg the NHS).
The goals of 'freedom' and 'equality' are imprecise,
and imply different emphases on equity. In addition,
health care systems usually have goals whose nature is
imprecise, and even where some degree of precision is
attained in goal setting, the efficiency of the means is
an area of supposition rather than of fact. The
contending ideologies contain empirical statements
about these means, whose verity could and should be
tested. Unfortunately this rarely happens. As a
consequence, we have, through time, the recurring
advocacy of privatisation or socialisation. Whilst such
advocacy may be the stuff of politics, it results in
superficial policy formulation and the waste of scarce
intellectual talent in policy analysis. In contrast, this
article will strive to understand the precise nature of
the health care market and the ramifications for
policy, public and private, of the imperfections of this
market.
The Nature of the Health Care Market
The supply side: monopolistic (non-competitive)
market
The advocates of the market solution recognise that a
major obstacle to the smooth running of a competitive
market is monopoly power, or the ability of the sellers
of health care services to influence (to their advantage)
the prices of their services. As Adam Smith [1776, Bk I
chap 10:1171 observed: 'People of the same trade
seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices'. The health care market is not competitively
organised; it is highly imperfect and characterised by
powerful professional monopolies which inhibit the
competitive interplay of the 'hidden' hand of the
market. The market for health care is also
characterised by uncertainty: the patient does not
know when he will be ill, and he is likely to be relatively
inefficient in determining the appropriate diagnosis
and treatment for his condition. Generally society, in
order to protect its members from 'quacks' and
uncertainty, has created social institutions -
professional regulations - to ensure that doctors are
'expert' in their trade and do offer efficacious health
care [Arrow 1963].
The counter argument to this position has been set out
by Friedman [1962]. He contends that professional
regulation is used to further the interests of the
profession. Citing US experience, he argues that the
profession - by controlling entry into medical
schools - has restricted the supply of doctors, and
inflated their incomes. Furthermore, the profession is
said to have inflated the 'quality' of doctors (measured
in terms of duration of training) regardless of its costs,
and this in the absence of scientific evidence that the
present quality of physicians (measured in terms of
their impact on the health status of patients) is
adequate.
Whether Arrow's or Friedman's position is adopted, it
is clear that the state, in all Western countries, has
given the medical profession considerable monopoly
power to influence the quantity and quality of its
services, and its own remuneration. The profession
appears to have used its power both in the public
interest and its own self interest [Frech 1974, Leffler
1978]. Professional organisations use their power to
influence their remuneration, and hence all such
organisations in the health sector will seek to protect
health care expenditure as this is the source of their
income.
The uncertainty associated with health care, which led
to the state enforcement of professional power, does
create additional problems. Although it is generally an
individual patient's decision to make the first contact
with the health care system, after that the patient
usually delegates much of the demand decision-
making to the doctor. The patient thus uses the doctor
as his agent to make health care demand decisions for
him, so that in a sense the supplier of health care - the
doctor - is also the demander [for a summary of the
literature see United States DHHS 1981]. If this
'agency relationship' is used just in the interests of the
patient, there may be only limited implications for the
efficient use of resources. However the doctor may use
this relationship to his own advantage, for example, to
increase his income by raising the demand for his
services.
The existing market for doctors is highly imperfect (ie
non-competitive) and is characterised by monopoly.
In addition, there are severe restrictions on
competition elsewhere in the health care market. The
pharmaceutical companies exert monopoly power,
utilising patent legislation. In advanced market
economies the hospital sector is mostly either publicly
owned, at local or central level, or run by private
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non-profit making bodies. In this situation, the
incentives to seek out cost effective practices in both
the public and private sectors may be similar and
weak. In both types of organisation the managers get
no direct reward for any cost savings, so why should
they seek them out? Not only are incentives weak,
there is also scope for 'producer agreements', often
protected by state legislation, which may limit
competition in the market for hospital beds.
Thus the supply side of the health care market is
characterised by a lack of competition and by
powerful, well established, state supported, monopoly
power. It is not surprising that in this environment
little is known about the efficiency with which
resources are used. In the context of the health care
market the doctor may regard a procedure as clinically
effective if it is the most effective therapy available to
improve the health status of an individual suffering
from a particular complaint - but often evidence to
reach this conclusion is absent due to the lack of
evaluation of practice. A procedure may be cost-
effective if it is the cheapest way of achieving a given
therapeutic end, without the value of this end
(outcome) being questioned. A procedure is econoini-
cally efficient if cost is minimised, outcome benefit is
maximised, and the services provided are those most
highly valued by society. Thus therapy X may improve
health status by 10 units at cost £10 whilst therapy Y
may improve health by 10 units at cost £1000 and
therapy Z may not improve health at all and cost £1.
Therapies X and Y are clinically effective, they alter
health status. Therapy X is cost effective, it is the
cheapest way of achieving a 10 unit increase in health
status. Therapy X may not be efficient: if alternative
therapies of similar cost produce benefits more highly
valued (by society), then therapy X, whilst cost
effective, may not be implemented.
The existing supply side forces, which in competitive
markets help to bring about economic efficiency, do
not operate well in the health care market. Clinical
freedom and professional power have prevented the
creation of mechanisms which ensure that practitioners
evaluate clinical outcomes and their cost implications.
Such behaviour is not only inefficient but can also be
said to be unethical: resources used inefficiently are
not available to treat those who are in the queue and
who could potentially gain more, in terms of health
status, if they were treated.
Doctor demands, not patient demands
The effects of these 'supply side' failures in the market
mechanism have been compounded by effects on the
demand side, which are similar for public and private
(Insurance-type) institutions. The British NHS is tax
financed and removes the price barrier to consumption.
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With the demand for health care being infinite, and the
supply finite and fixed by government fiat, the NHS
inevitably manifests excess demand, as shown by
waiting lists. Scarce resources are allocated amongst
competing demands by doctors according to imprecise
notions of 'need' [Williams 1978], eg scarce kidney
machines are allocated in the NHS to young married
people rather than single, elderly people: if you are
over 45 years of age you are unlikely to get treatment
for renal failure in the UK.
The insurance system allocates resources according to
willingness and ability to pay. Insurance coverage may
remove the price barrier to consumption just like the
NHS, though premiums and coinsurance ration excess
demand. This reduces the demand of the poor more
than of the rich, but also the demand of the less ill
more than of the severely ill [Cairns and Snell 1978,
Maynard 1979, Newhouse et al 1981]. Those who can
pay the price of the coinsurance and the insurance
premiums can enter the market and, subject to the
'agency relationship', they will get access to care.
In both the NHS and the insurance system the doctor
has a crucial role as an allocator of resources;
effectively the doctor decides who will be treated or
not treated, and how. The doctor is the 'guardian' who
determines treatment patterns. He is guided by the
ethic to provide the best care for the patient in his
charge, regardless of cost. Either the state or the
insurance fund meets the cost of care. Hardly ever
does the doctor have to evaluate costs and benefits of
improvement in health status at the margin. There are
no effective institutional devices to persuade doctors
and patients to be efficient users of society's scarce
health care resources: the bill is picked up by a third
party, either by the tax payer or by the insurance
company.
The many imperfections of the health care market
Some people, in particular those who have adopted
the market ideology, tend to believe that markets will
be more efficient than governments in allocating
resources, because the competitive process rewards
cost minimisers and provides incentives for decision
makers to behave efficiently. However, in the health
care sector significant market imperfections -
professional power, the 'agency relationship' and the
nature of the insurance mechanism - blunt the
competitive system considerably. Markets, both
public and private, are likely to be inefficient
allocators of scarce health care resources. The
superiority of the market, if it exists, has to be
identified and quantified empirically, not merely
asserted as a matter of faith.
The Regulation of the Health Care Market
As was shown in the previous section, the incentives
for the doctor to pursue the goals of efficiency and
equity are very meagre, and inefficiency and inequity
are readily identifiable [Maynard 1981, Maynard and
Ludbrook 1981, Townsend and Davidson 1982].
Almost everywhere this leads to regulation of the
health care market: the representatives of society want
greater efficiency - value for resources - and less
inequality in the distribution of health care.
Regulation means that activities will be controlled or
moderated by rules. The acts of control and
moderation can be exercised by public or private
bodies, and an important question is how such
regulation bears on individuals, the profession, and
other providers. Both the public and private sectors
can be regulated by rules devised within the sector, as
well as from outside it (for example, both the state and
professional bodies may have a role in the regulation
of either sector).
The operation of public or private controlling bodies
will be directed at moderating the activities of decision
makers (primarily clinicians) and influencing the price
of health care services, of labour (eg doctors' pay) and
of capital (eg the rate of return on pharmaceutical or
hospital investments), and the quality and quantity of
these inputs. Often controls will be working against
one another and have countervailing effects. Thus
everywhere the doctors seek to increase their income,
while the paying agencies, whether sickness funds or
the state, will endeavour to reduce the rate of growth
of expenditure, which in the event may restrict
incomes or employment [see Lacronique 1982].
As Enthoven [1980] has argued for the United States,
the liberal market 'solution' requires vigorous
regulatory activity if competition is to be created and
sustained in the financing and provision of health care.
Similarly the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany,
and France are taking, or have taken already, steps to
regulate their health care markets. In the UK, the NHS
'solution' has led to detailed regulation of budget
allocation, priority setting and decision-making. Yet
new incentives are clearly required to moderate the
inefficiency of both types of systems [Maynard and
Ludbrook 1980].
It seems unlikely that vigorous competition can be
created and sustained in health care markets by simple
solutions such as pluralisation of insurance sources as
against single-source finance. 'Friedmanite' pro-
competition reforms would impose employment and
income losses which would be very 'expensive' in
political terms [McLachlan and Maynard 19821. As
the distinguished economist Uwe Reinhardt has
pointed out: 'Friedman's vision should send shivers
down the spine of any straight-thinking physician'
[Reinhardt 1982]. Only a farsighted policy seeking to
evaluate and innovate in all spheres of regulatory
activity is likely to help reduce inefficiency and
mitigate inequality.
Innovations in Health Care Management
Whatever the priorities settled on by policy makers,
and whatever the nature of the public/private mix in
health care in the years to come, there is a set of
common challenges which must be taken up to make
the system more efficient and effective in the face of
rising demands. At the forefront of these challenges is
the need to improve the managerial training of doctors
and develop an efficient management structure which
is provided with adequate evaluative information
about the available public and private services.
Training of doctors
Doctors are the 'gatekeepers' of the health care
system. In many places they decide who will get access
to what health care. Yet their training in decision-
making is quite inadequate. Moreover, in spite of the
emphasis in medical schools on a scientific approach,
doctors tend not to acquire the habits of scientific
appraisal of their own performance and generally have
limited skills in the management of resources. As
Weed [1981], himself a physician, has argued:
Because the system has been so poorly defined over
the years, there has been no way to relate the
outputs of the system to inputs; conjectures piled
upon conjectures have hardened into curriculums
and licensing laws. Reviewing some of these
conjectures in terms of the tasks of medicine, we
can now see how far off the track the medical
establishment has strayed.
This argument is consistent with that of Cochrane
[19721 and many other observers, medical and non-
medical, in the UK. The failure to evaluate
input/output links in health care has led to training
which is not based on scientific fact but frequently on
conjecture. In this situation it is no surprise that
students are not trained adequately to question
existing practices. As a result of this inadequate
training, doctors have neither the knowledge to use
resources efficiently nor the incentive to research their
practices and improve their efficiency. It could even be
argued that this results in behaviour which, from the
medical point of view, is unethical. Incidentally, the
Hippocratic oath puts the social before the individual
ethic, and the inefficient use of resources may result in
care being denied to many. Efficiency requires that
inputs should be used in a way that maximises output
in terms of health status improvements.
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One approach to remedying these shortcomings is the
training of doctors in management, health economics
and statistics, evaluation, and the identification of
input/output links. This would involve an opportunity
cost (ie something else in the curriculum would have to
be given up). However, such special training may yield
significant benefits, especially if it is sustained
throughout the cycle of a doctor's practising life
through a system of continuing education so that his
evaluative and management skills are augmented
regularly.
Such a change in training patterns may be helped by
the slowly growing realisation of the potential
contribution of economic knowledge to improving the
efficiency of resource allocation in medical care. The
Medical Research Council and the Social Science
Research Council in the UK financed the work of
Drummond to provide a guide for doctors to the
principles and practice of economic evaluation
[Drummond 1980, 1981]. Cost containment policies in
many countries are obliging doctors to compete
among themselves and to justify more explicitly than
hitherto their claims on scarce resources. This
competition for resources may in time provide a spur
to doctors to identify input/output links and to use
resources more efficiently - but they can only do this
if their training has given them the appropriate tools.
Enabling managers to manage
Be it in the public or private sector, the managers of
scarce health care resources must be given incentives
and the means to manage. At present doctors de facto
decide who will get the care, yet neither their training
nor their professional ethic explicitly assign to them
the management role. There still has to be a
recognition of this problem in the policy approaches
to health care systems, public or private.
The key to good management is information -
'intelligence' - about inputs and outputs, and
knowledge ofthe linkages between these two elements.
Good 'intelligence' is neither a cheap commodity, nor
easy to come by. It is therefore naive to argue that
Medicare in the US, or the NHS in the UK, are 'over-
bureaucratised' as long as certain essential admini-
strative jobs are not being done. Public and private
health care systems require an efficient bureaucracy if
they are to use resources efficiently. In certain
respects, health care institutions may suffer from
under-administration: they have inadequate means of
keeping under review the quantity and quality of their
medical, financial and other managers. Yet while it is
conventional wisdom that public systems of health
care are often inflexible and inefficient resource users,
it is not easily accepted that this might be because of
false economy in certain aspects of administration. In
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the NHS, after 34 years of experience, there is still no
adequate system of information gathering, evaluation
and dissemination, which top management can use
effectively and with confidence.
The availability of better information about the costs
and benefits of health care, and the characteristics of
decisions in health care systems, does not necessarily
change behaviour. Good management is about
'selling' or 'packaging' this information in such a way
that decision-making at the key levels is improved.
One of the reasons why this may not happen is that
health care institutions often fail to allocate clearly the
role of the manager. In the NHS, medical,
administrative, financial, and nursing managers have
worked side by side, with no clear definition of who
has ultimate responsibility. This carelessness in system
design has contributed considerably the inefficient
application of resources. Managers must have clear
roles and their performance must be monitored
carefully. It may be possible to use individual or
institutional financial incentives to help achieve more
efficient practice. Knowledge about the nature of these
inducements and their effects on behaviour is less than
satisfactory, but there is considerable scope for
experimentation [McLachlan and Maynard 1982].
Overall management merits greater attention than it
has had hitherto.
Research Priorities
The problems discussed in the preceding section have
to be considered by policy makers if health care
systems, public and private, are to be made more
efficient. This section sets out briefly a series of
questions which could lead to the establishment of
policy-relevant research priorities for the next two
decades, irrespective of the form of health care system
and the public/private mix. The questions comprise
most of the relevant issues facing any modern
industrial society and would provide an agenda to
specify the right directions for health service research
in the remaining years of this century. Posing the
questions also assumes that those in government with
responsibility for scientific research, including health
services research, will be willing to formulate a
coherent strategy for the long term. The answers to the
questions will differ from country to country, but
answers must be sought if resource allocation is to be
based on a real understanding of the issues and made
less wasteful.
- What are the objectives of the health care system,
regardless of the public/private mix? What
ordering or weight do these objectives get and how
are these changing over time? Equity in terms of
distribution and access is important and covers
most systems: how is this likely to be affected by
change in the public/private mix?
- Who is really responsible for control of the
system(s), and who controls resource use at the
'boundaries' of care? Particularly relevant are the
'boundaries' between hospital and primary care;
between capital and current revenue allocation;
between capital and labour; between the public and
private sectors. Who controls any movements in
these boundaries? What criteria are used to
determine policy-making at these boundaries?
How could insurance principles and practice be
made to concern themselves more with general
practice, prevention, the care of the elderly, and
other 'Cinderella' activities?
- Why do decision makers at the boundaries behave
as they do? What incentives motivate public and
private action, and the interaction between the
public and private sectors? What monetary and
non-monetary incentives are there to promote
efficiency for individual managers and for
institutions in the public and private sectors? Is
inefficient behaviour an inevitable product of poor
incentives? Could new incentives be identified that
are likely to alter behaviour in the public and
private sectors to make it more consistent with
policy objectives?
- Who rations what and how in health care? What
criteria are used by decision makers in the public
and private sectors to allocate scarce health care
resources at the micro (operational) level? Is the
allocation which results consistent with the avowed
rationing criteria of the sector and its policy
objectives?
- What investment criteria are used in the public and
private health care sectors - for example, to decide
who will get a new hospital or a new piece of
medical equipment? Are the techniques of
investment appraisal used? If so, how? Are the
criteria consistent with policy objectives and the
optimum use of resources?
What are the major unresolved problems in the
health care system? This question takes us back to
the first. Are outcomes, in terms of efficiency and
distributional equity, however defined, consistent
with policy objectives or does the system (and its
public and private sectors) fail to meet its
objectives?
These questions should help to clarify objectives,
elucidate how decisions are made, and help make
management more efficient. Most health care
activities have not yet been evaluated, and to identify
efficient practice requires substantial investments in
the evaluation of the outcomes of clinical procedures
and of the cost-effectiveness of organisational
practices (eg solo or group practice, health centres,
etc). If the private sector expands, it should take an
increasing share in financing this activity rather than,
as at present, taking a 'free ride' off public action,
which itself has so far been inadequate.
This type of analysis should also shed light on certain
controversial issues in the organisation of health care.
For instance, the case for contracting out NHS
ancillary services (eg catering, cleaning and laundry) is
unsubstantiated, being based on limited empirical
knowledge and speculation. Experimentation is
essential. Similarly, the case for the NHS buying
surgical services from the private sector is based on the
assertion that the private sector can provide such
supplementary services more cheaply. Again the
evidence to sustain this view is absent. If the view is
wrong, 'privatisation' will in fact inflate public
expenditure: a public service might be able to provide
such services more cheaply and contain public
expenditure on health care more effectively [Waxman
1982]. This is another area that needs experimentation,
with controlled trials and monitoring over a
reasonable period.
Research endeavours in these and other important
areas will require the cooperation of practitioners in
many disciplines: epidemiologists, statisticians, socio-
logists, accountants and economists, and will take
time to provide answers. Defining and operationalising
measures of output or outcomes will be difficult. A
follow-up of patients for 5-10 years is required to
ascertain the full effects of some medical interventions.
Progress in evaluation will be slow, costly and
difficult, but it must figure as a priority if scarce
resources are to be used efficiently. There is also a need
to investigate the behaviour of decision makers. For
example, modelling the behaviour of doctors, nurses,
the pharmaceutical industry, and public and private
hospitals, could provide explanations of existing
behaviour, and indicate how it could be altered and
made consistent with policy objectives.
The research required to answer these various priority
questions may be difficult and expensive, but applies
to all health care systems regardless of the
public/private mix. They do not involve ideological
debate and foolhardy designs to solve fundamental
problems whose nature is ill-understood and whose
resolution is impossible in the present state of
ignorance. The approach is that of science rather than
of rhetoric.
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Shifting the public/private mix, cost containment
policies, and the pursuit of 'value for money', do not
remove the need for regulation; they have a marginal
effect and mostly just change its nature. This is
specially true in periods of great financial restraint, as
the present one. Such regulation is unavoidable
because of inherent features of the health care market:
monopolies fix the prices, quantities, and qualities of
the goods and services they sell in a manner
advantageous to them (the providers) rather than the
clients (patients); social institutions (eg a tax-financed
health service, and insurance arrangements, both
private and social) reduce the price barriers to
consumption and provide incentives for patients to
over-consume because a third party (taxpayers or
insurance contributors) pays; and there are few
incentives for decision makers (doctors and managers
of various sorts) to behave efficiently (je to ensure
costs are minimised and benefits maximised).
These market 'failures' occur in the public sector and
the private sector alike. Both sectors are manifestly
inadequate in the way they identify the goals of policy,
and identify and evaluate the alternative means by
which policy objectives can be pursued. Mere
alterations in the public/private mix are often
proposed which do not even attempt to draw on the
lessons of the past. The 1948, 1974 and 1982
(re)organisations of the NHS, and the recent
expansion of the private sector in the UK, have not
remedied the failures of the health care market, public
and private. Rather have they diverted attention -
and energies - away from the fundamental problems
of providing health care with efficiency and equity.
The real resolution of the questions involved will take
many decades of careful research, experiments and
developments contributing to policy formation. It
would be folly not to recognise the extent of the time
scale required and the need for careful planning of this
activity, in which government has a key role.
Elsewhere, the problems may be different, but not
fundamentally so. Scarcity exists in all economies,
developed and developing, and in all health care
systems. The problems posed by scarcity - efficiency
and equity - and by the nature of the health care
sector are similar, and always and everywhere difficult
to resolve. One lesson is clear, especially for
developing countries. The adoption of technological
innovations without a careful assessment of their
impact on efficiency and equity is a simple leap in the
dark. Very often such an assessment is likely to show
that the latest 'technological marvels' have little
impact on health but deplete resources significantly.
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